On Fri, Feb 23, 2018 at 4:42 PM Larrew, Jesse <Jesse.Larrew@amd.com> wrote:
From: Castelino, Manohar R [mailto:manohar.r.castelino@intel.com] Sent: Friday, February 23, 2018 3:53 PM To: Larrew, Jesse <Jesse.Larrew@amd.com>; Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hollingsworth, Brent <brent.hollingsworth@amd.com>; Woller, Thomas <thomas.woller@amd.com>; Kaplan, David <David.Kaplan@amd.com>; kata- dev@lists.katacontainers.io Subject: RE: [kata-dev] Kata with AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
Jesse,
On EPYC, our IOMMU doesn't yet support SEV, so DMA to/from devices needs to be done using unencrypted pages. It was easy to implement this using the bounce buffers provided by SWIOTLB. As you guessed, a quick change to vring_use_dma_api() got virtio support working properly:
Clear Containers today supports direct device assignment via SRIOV. This requires pre-allocation and pinning of VM memory. Will this continue to work?
Also we have been working on reverse ballooning. i.e. free unused memory from the VM back to the host. Is there is a way to get this to work with encrypted memory
For more details about the patches https://gist.github.com/sboeuf/fc71f0218a81997251ee0d7668df2bd9
-manohar
Hi Manohar,
SEV also requires the guest memory to be pre-allocated and pinned [1], so that's not a problem. As long as the PF drivers in the guest are using the dma apis, everything should continue to work.
That's surprising -- I can see where reclaim would be challenging without something like a balloon, but why must the be initially backed? What happens if you leave a page unbacked and attempt to lazily back it on an EPT fault?
Similarly, the reverse ballooning patches should also work with SEV. In fact, I would argue that SEV compliments this feature by ensuring that physical page contents aren't exposed to the host when the guest uses MADV_FREE. I've CC'ed our KVM expert, Brijesh Singh, just in case he sees something that I missed.
Sincerely, Jesse
[1] In order to ensure that memory blocks with identical data will encrypt to different ciphertext, SEV mixes the physical address into the encryption algorithm. As a result, if a page of memory is moved to a different physical address, it will not decrypt properly. This also defeats block-move attacks on the guest memory, but it also requires all guest memory to be pinned. _______________________________________________ kata-dev mailing list kata-dev@lists.katacontainers.io http://lists.katacontainers.io/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/kata-dev