On Mon, 2018-09-24 at 22:20 +0000, Boeuf, Sebastien wrote:
The long term solution seems to rely on /dev/urandom device as this one will not block if no entropy is ready yet. But from what we can read online, it seems that some people have some security concerns about it. I'd like to understand if those worries are valid or not, and if we should keep thinking about another way to fix this issue.
Hi, here's an extract of `man 7 random`: Choice of random source Unless you are doing long-term key generation (and most likely not even then), you probably shouldn't be reading from the /dev/random device or employing getrandom(2) with the GRND_RANDOM flag. Instead, either read from the /dev/urandom device or employ getrandom(2) without the GRND_RANDOM flag. The cryptographic algorithms used for the urandom source are quite conservative, and so should be sufficient for all purposes. In my view, given the ephemeral aspect of containers, /dev/urandom should be fine most of the time. As an option, user should be left the possibility to select /dev/random if that is needed for his specific application. BTW, it may be worth investigating on what is the state of the art solution chosen in virtualization systems with a high VM count. Marco
Thanks, Sebastien _______________________________________________ kata-dev mailing list kata-dev@lists.katacontainers.io http://lists.katacontainers.io/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/kata-dev