Kata currently launches QEMU as user 'root' and I haven't found isolation mechanisms that would confine the QEMU process in the event of a guest escape. Inevitably there will be a security bug that allows a malicious guest to escape to QEMU, so it's important that the QEMU process is unprivileged and isolated. Running QEMU as 'root' simplifies 9p configuration by allowing the QEMU process to access files with any uid/gid. QEMU does support other 9p configurations where the QEMU process does not run as root, including the virtfs-proxy-helper privilege separation approach. Are there any other reasons for running the QEMU process as root? For comparison, libvirt launches QEMU as the unprivileged 'qemu' user with a unique SELinux context. This makes it much harder to access other guests or escape to the host if the guest compromises QEMU. Is there any work underway to improve isolation in Kata? Two directions that come to mind are: 1. Design isolation from scratch for Kata, including unprivileged uid/gid, namespaces, and SELinux. This requires changes to Kata because the QEMU process will not be able to open arbitrary files (e.g. device hotplug, 9p configuration). FWIW, relying on namespaces doesn't add a lot of security because if the guest is malicious, then that may well be because of a Linux namespaces security hole - the attacker could just use the same exploit again to escape from QEMU to the host. 2. Use libvirt-go (API) or libvirt-go-xml (XML) instead of govmm to get strong isolation. This would also slim down virtcontainers and remove the dependency on govmm (no more command-line munging and defining object models for QEMU command-line concepts). Stefan